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Unsustainable Growth: Preserving
Disability Programs for 
Americans with Disabilities
Andrew I. Batavia 
Florida International University
The Social Security disability programs, which constitute the essen 
tial safety net for people with disabilities in our country, are growing at 
an unsustainable rate. If we are truly committed to meeting the needs 
of people with disabilities, we must make the changes necessary to 
ensure the long-term viability of these programs. I do not want my fol 
lowing remarks to be misconstrued; while I have no commitment to the 
status quo, I am deeply committed to developing well-designed dis 
ability programs that provide income security while encouraging inde 
pendence for people with disabilities.
I approach these issues from two different, but mutually reinforcing, 
perspectives. First, I view them as a policymaker on Capitol Hill who is 
responding to several national goals: to balance the budget and to get 
the economy back on track, to make government run more efficiently, 
and to assist people with disabilities to live productively and indepen 
dently. Second, I look at them as a person with a disability, who was 
once a recipient of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program,
NOTE: This chapter is based on comments delivered when the author was serving as 
Legislative Assistant to Senator John McCain. Several significant program changes 
have occurred since the time of that presentation, particularly with respect to the eligi 
bility of legal aliens and proposals concerning treatment of children with disabilities. 
The chapter should therefore be read not for current program content, but for concep 
tual and historical insight into the programs from the perspective of a Senate aide who 
has a disability and significant experience with the programs. Andrew Batavia is cur 
rently associate professor at the School of Policy Management, College of Urban and 
Public Affairs, Florida International University. The views expressed are solely those 
of the author, and do not necessarily represent the positions of Senator McCain, or any 
organization with which Mr. Batavia is or has been affiliated.
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and who has some serious concerns about the disability programs and 
their effect on people with disabilities.
A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
From the perspective of a policymaker, the rapid rate of growth of 
the disability programs in recent years is alarming. The number of 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries alone increased 
27 percent from 1989 to 1993, as compared with a 7 percent increase 
in retired worker social security beneficiaries (DHHS 1994). Disability 
benefit payments increased 51 percent over that period. Applications, 
eligibility awards, and payments for the SSI program are also growing 
dramatically.
Altogether, the federal government is currently spending about $70 
billion each year for the social security disability programs, almost 
twice as much as five years ago (Board of Trustees 1995; Committee 
on Ways and Means 1994). If this upward trend continues, the pro 
grams soon will be subject to increasing political scrutiny and criti 
cism. Eventually, public support for them will dissipate. Because these 
programs are so important, we must get them under control.
There has been a dramatic change over the past thirty years in the 
way our society perceives people with disabilities (see articles by Ross 
and by Weaver, this chapter). Previously, when an individual incurred a 
permanent and significant disability, the general expectation was that 
he or she would no longer be employable or even potentially employ 
able. In recent years, as a result of the independent living movement, 
improvements in assistive technology, and enhanced environmental 
accessibility, there is an increased expectation that even people with 
very substantial disabilities can work.
This social change is best evidenced by the enactment of the Ameri 
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the civil rights law that rep 
resents a national consensus on the goals of our nation's disability 
policy and the legitimate expectations for our citizens with disabilities. 
Many of our disability laws that were established prior to 1990 are 
inconsistent with the ADA's basic premise that people with disabilities 
can be employable and must be given the opportunity to live full and
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productive lives. It is incumbent upon policy makers to ensure that all 
disability policy is consistent with the premises and goals of the ADA 
(DeJong and Batavia 1990).
A PERSONAL DISABILITY PERSPECTIVE
From my perspective as a person with a disability, I am concerned 
about the "entitlement mentality" that the social security disability pro 
grams impose on their recipients, particularly on young people with 
disabilities. Beneficiaries, and even potential beneficiaries, are repeat 
edly given the message that they have a right to benefits as long as they 
can demonstrate an inability to work by virtue of a disability. Even 
those raised with a strong work ethic begin to think about how they can 
demonstrate their absolute inability to work. Once that mind set is 
internalized, it is very difficult to alter.
To avoid this counterproductive self-fulfilling prophecy, people with 
disabilities must be brought into the mainstream of the community as 
soon as possible. This is why antidiscrimination laws such as the ADA 
and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) are so 
important. People with disabilities must obtain an expectation of 
employability before they receive and accept the societal message that 
they are "too disabled" ever to work.
In 1973, when my spinal cord was injured in an automobile accident 
at the age of 16,1 was confronted with conflicting messages from the 
people running our nation's disability programs. I was informed that, 
because of the "severity" of my disability (C2-3 quadriplegia), I would 
qualify for SSI and therefore be entitled to cash benefits and Medicaid 
for the rest of my life. However, if I demonstrated the ability to earn a 
small amount of money, I would be disqualified and all of these bene 
fits would no longer be available to me. (This was before the various 
work incentive provisions were enacted in the 1980s.)
I made a decision that was, in a sense, irrational. I decided to take a 
great risk—to go to college, law school, and graduate school with the 
support of vocational rehabilitation, and to thereby become employ 
able notwithstanding my disability. To most Americans, this decision 
may seem neither irrational nor risky. However, by doing so, I was
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potentially compromising tens of thousands of dollars of life-sustain 
ing support for the rest of my life. Moreover, I was doing so without 
any assurance that I would be able to earn comparable benefits through 
employment. The likelihood of regaining eligibility once I had demon 
strated the ability to work seemed remote.
I was fortunate. I have a supportive family and friends who encour 
aged me to take that risk. I also had a vocational rehabilitation counse 
lor named Joan Brown who believed in me and who provided advocacy 
in obtaining the educational benefits I needed. Many people with dis 
abilities do not have such supports. As evidenced by program statistics, 
most make the low-risk decision to stay on the programs permanently. 
Given the basic structure of the system, even with its current work 
incentive provisions, this is not an irrational economic decision. Many 
simply do not trust the government to allow them to regain their bene 
fits once they have lost them.
This has convinced me that we need to alter the programs' structures 
to create strong incentives for people with disabilities to seek gainful 
employment and ultimately to leave the programs. I come to this con 
clusion not because it will save the taxpayers money. In fact, it will 
probably cost somewhat more in the short run to provide the opportu 
nity for people with disabilities to work. I support structural reform of 
the programs because it will improve the lives of people with disabili 
ties by helping them to achieve their highest potentials.
THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS
The 104th Congress recently enacted major welfare reform. Inter 
estingly, in a political climate in which almost all means-tested welfare 
programs were being considered to be block granted to the states, the 
disability programs have been largely exempt from the block-granting 
debate. There appears to be a general consensus that these programs 
are such an important part of the safety net that they should continue as 
entitlements. However, that does not mean that they should maintain 
their current structures and policies. The rapid growth of the disability 
programs ensures that we will soon be engaged in a debate over what 
changes should be made.
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The causes of the programs' growth is an extremely complex issue 
and is not well understood (GAO 1994). Among the factors that appear 
to affect the increase in program applications are economic conditions, 
the policies of other social programs, state efforts encouraging people 
to apply, and demographics (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2). However, all 
of these factors interact with the policy structures of the disability pro 
grams. There is a basic conflict between the fundamental premises of 
these programs and the ADA. I believe that this incongruity explains 
much of the reason that very few beneficiaries ever leave the disability 
rolls.
The disability programs are based on an outdated premise equating 
disability with unemployability. DI was initially structured as an early 
retirement program, with the foundational notion that if a person had a 
disability, he or she was basically unemployable; and there was there 
fore no reason to expend substantial resources in a futile effort to get 
the individual ready to work. In this stage of our history, we recognize 
that this is simply not the case. There have been attempts over the years 
to modify the programs' presumption of unemployability through the 
various work incentive provisions. However, the programs still main 
tain their self-defeating historical premise. Until we address this flaw, 
we are not going to get beneficiaries to work.
Adults with Disabilities
The recent growth in the number of adults in the programs appears 
to be largely a result of economic recessions and changes in state pub 
lic assistance programs (Stapleton et al., Chapter 2). In addition, the 
demographics of our aging population is expected to contribute signifi 
cantly to future growth, as the large baby boom population becomes 
more disabled and chronically ill.
While such factors have important implications and represent a 
challenge to finite federal and state budgets, they should not be the pri 
mary focus of program policy. Such growth could be constrained 
through more restrictive eligibility criteria. However, to the extent that 
this would disqualify individuals with significant disabilities that, at 
least temporarily, preclude employment, it would ultimately increase 
their vulnerability and interfere with their employment objectives. By 
far, the more important policy considerations for addressing the growth
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of the adult beneficiary population are appropriate vocational rehabili 
tation, education, and return to work.
Certainly, we should be developing better criteria and mechanisms 
(e.g., functional assessment measures) to determine who should be eli 
gible (Batavia 1992). The current eligibility system is based primarily 
on a medical model of disability that equates impairment with the 
inability to work. The Listing of Impairments used by the Social Secu 
rity Administration (SSA) is a poor proxy for determining functional 
deficits and inability to work. SSA's system of ongoing medical 
reviews in which beneficiaries are categorized and reviewed periodi 
cally according to expected medical improvement is also largely irrele 
vant. Capacity to work is not necessarily associated with medical 
condition or improvement in medical condition; the relationship is far 
more complex, with the more important variables being functional 
capacity and social (e.g., family) support.
Return to work is currently impeded by program policies that dis 
courage beneficiary efforts to become rehabilitated and employed and 
that do not encourage maintenance of any existing relationships with 
former employers (Mashaw et al. 1996; Burkhauser and Haveman 
1982). These policies range from the medical model definition of dis 
ability (assuming a causal relationship between an impairment and the 
ability to work), to a waiting period for eligibility that discourages 
early rehabilitation, to a benefit structure that creates an enormous dis 
incentive to work.
As suggested above, in response to a general consensus that these 
disability programs impose substantial disincentives to work, several 
laws were enacted by Congress in the 1980s to encourage SSI and DI 
beneficiaries to seek gainful employment and leave the disability rolls 
(NARF 1988). Yet, despite this legislation and indications that many 
disability beneficiaries wish to work, few ever leave the programs vol 
untarily (Muller 1989). In December 1993, only 35,299 of the 5.98 
million disabled SSI recipients participated in the Section 1619 work 
incentive program (DHHS 1994, Tables 7.F5 and 7.A3).
The unabated growth of the programs and the failure of the work 
incentive provisions to curtail such growth have demonstrated that 
incremental changes are not sufficient. We need substantial structural 
reform to ensure the long-term viability of the disability programs. In 
1991, when Susan Parker was Associate Commissioner for Disability
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of SSA and I was associate director of the White House Domestic Pol 
icy Council in the Bush administration, we and our staffs developed a 
proposal to fundamentally alter the premises of the disability pro 
grams. It would maintain the entitlement status of the programs but 
make them time-limited, thus creating a presumption and expectation 
of employability (Batavia and Parker 1995).
Our proposal would create four categories of disability:
1. A Permanent Disability Pension, which would apply to individu 
als with no capacity to work (e.g., people with severe brain 
injury)
2. A Temporary Disability Benefit, which would apply to the vast 
majority of beneficiaries, whose benefits would be limited to 
three years but would be potentially expandable for education, 
training, and other activities to become employable
3. An Early Retirement Benefit, which would allow people with dis 
abilities 55 years of age and over to opt out of the job market and 
accept early social security retirement
4. Provision Benefits, including personal assistance services, assis- 
tive technology, and training that would be provided to Tempo 
rary Disability beneficiaries to become employable
In addition, the proposal includes several other provisions that are 
geared to enhance administrative efficiency and encourage beneficia 
ries to work. These include elimination of the current five-month wait 
ing period for DI, expediting the paperwork, determining the 
appropriate course of action through increased beneficiary and physi 
cian responsibilities, using case management techniques to capitalize 
on the beneficiary's functional capacity and relationship with former 
employers, creating positive incentives to work, and establishing a con 
tract between the SSA and the beneficiary in which both would have 
responsibility to ensure that the beneficiary may become employed as 
soon as feasible.
The overarching goal of the proposal is to alter the culture of the 
programs by changing the expectations of all parties. However, the 
proposal will only work if there is adequate funding for rehabilitation, 
training and provision benefits, and if positive incentives to work are
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built in. Fear of losing health insurance and personal assistance ser 
vices creates among the greatest disincentives to work for people with 
disabilities (Friedland and Evans 1996; Batavia, DeJong, and Me Knew 
1993; Burns, Batavia, and DeJong 1991). An array of policy options, 
including reform of our in-kind benefit programs, are available to 
reduce these disincentives (Batavia 1993, 1996).
Children with Disabilities
Much attention has been focused on the rapid growth in the number 
of children in the disability programs after the Zebley Supreme Court 
decision. That decision dealt with the legal standard for children's eli 
gibility. At this time in the history of the programs, we should reexam- 
ine the policy rationale underlying that eligibility standard. With 
respect to adults with disabilities, a cash benefit is clearly justified as 
income replacement for individuals who, as a result of their disabili 
ties, cannot work. This rationale applies to adults, at least for the period 
of time that they are incapable of employment. It does not apply to 
children with disabilities, who are not breadwinners and who therefore 
have not forgone income as a result of their disabilities.
Consequently, some other rationale is needed for a cash payment to 
children. Typically, the justification offered is that the child's disability 
requires the parents to work less and earn less than they otherwise 
would or to hire outside help to assist in addressing the child's disabil 
ity-related needs. The needs of a child with a disability are often much 
greater than those of a nondisabled child, and the costs of meeting 
those needs are correspondingly higher for children with disabilities.
Because the policy rationale for a cash benefit is stronger with 
respect to adults than children with disabilities, further policy consider 
ation should be given as to which children justify a cash payment. It 
may be that the needs of many children with disabilities can be 
addressed entirely through in-kind benefits, including health care, assis- 
tive technology, and personal assistance services. Alternatively, a cash 
benefit may be warranted in certain cases to allow one of the parents to 
stay home and take care of the child. Analysis may reveal that some 
children warrant higher payments than they are currently receiving.
Assuming that it is determined that a cash payment continues to be 
justified for certain children, substantial research will be needed in
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assessing the appropriate eligibility criteria for identifying such chil 
dren and in determining the appropriate amount of the payment.
Legal Aliens
Another issue that has received increasing attention lately is the 
large increase in the number of individuals from other countries who 
have entered the United States legally and who have become recipients 
of the disability programs. It has been reported to Congress that 
approximately 738,000 legal aliens currently receive SSI, up from 
127,000 in 1982 (Rector and Lauber 1995; Matloff 1994). This consti 
tutes a growth rate of 580 percent in just twelve years. The vast major 
ity are elderly, and most apply for benefits within five years of entry 
into the United States. This disturbing trend should not be occurring 
under long-standing federal immigration policy, which precludes 
aliens who may become a "public charge" from entering our country.
There is a tendency to scapegoat noncitizens for the problems of our 
country. In fact, legal aliens have always played an important role in 
our economy and have contributed significantly to the growth of our 
nation. To the extent that they pay into social programs over an exten 
sive period of time, they should be entitled to benefits, proportionate to 
their contribution. However, there is evidence that many are attracted 
to our country primarily by its generous social programs (Rector and 
Lauber 1995). To the extent that this is occurring, policy changes are 
needed. One approach might be to preclude benefits for a stated period 
of time (e.g., three, five, or ten years) after the individual legally enters 
the country.
CONCLUSIONS
There are those committed to the status quo who would argue that 
the policy changes being suggested here, such as time-limiting disabil 
ity benefits, lack compassion. They are wrong. What lacks compassion 
is a system that convinces people with disabilities, and particularly 
children with disabilities, that they are too disabled ever to work. Our 
disability programs currently are fundamentally flawed. While incre-
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mental reforms have improved the programs, they have not corrected 
the basic problems. We must fix the programs to ensure that the people 
who rely on them will receive the benefits that they need, but in a man 
ner that encourages and empowers them to be more independent and 
productive.
Most important, for all people with disabilities, we must raise the 
expectations of our disability programs. As much as any other factor, 
including the work disincentives built into the current system, the pre 
sumption that an impairment necessarily limits the ability to work has 
handicapped generations of program beneficiaries. The experience of 
hundreds of thousands of people with disabilities who are now work 
ing, despite significant functional limitations, proves that this presump 
tion is false. People with disabilities can become gainfully employed if 
we expect them to become gainfully employed, and if they expect 
themselves to become gainfully employed.
Adults with disabilities must be given the expectations, opportuni 
ties, and incentives to seek and obtain gainful employment. Children 
with disabilities must receive the education and training that they need, 
alongside children without disabilities to the extent possible, to offer 
them full opportunities throughout their lives. The programs should be 
reformed to ensure that every dollar spent is invested efficiently in the 
future of their beneficiaries. People with disabilities in our country 
must be encouraged to seek employment to improve their personal sit 
uations and to remove themselves from the dependency of the disabil 
ity programs. Such dependency is neither in their interest nor that of 
our country.
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